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Summary

In the cat and mouse game of cybersecurity, researchers are used to analyzing and prioritizing new malware techniques that emerge in the wild. In this context, malicious actors often launch campaigns based on old malware or old techniques, and they frequently succeed at staying under the radar. That's what happened with Glupteba, a backdoor first spotted in 2014. At the end of 2018, our Advanced Threat Control team observed a considerable wave of detections on a particular process name, <code>app.exe</code>, and started actively looking into it. We traced the process to the original Glupteba malware. The increasing number of such detections throughout the year suggests an extensive campaign focused on enterprise customers.

Infection does not take place through the consecrated attack avenues in enterprise, such as spear-phishing or APTs. Instead, the payload arrives on the computer by malvertising or through potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) designed to download it from compromised websites. These domains typically have a human-friendly name rather than a randomly generated one. The tell-tale sign is that they contain the malicious executable files in a specific sub-path ,/app/', which indicates the attackers generate and register these domains specifically to host the payload.

While the process that runs in the background might have several names, almost all infection cases reference the 'app.exe' process. That's why we might call the malware AppExe and Glupteba interchangeably in this article.


Operation of an already discovered malware comes with advantages and disadvantages. One advantage might be that some infection patterns are no longer trending and may go unnoticed by researchers. The disadvantage is implicit: researchers already know the malware's actions and indicators of compromise. However, attackers use a variety of tricks to keep the malware on the cutting edge of detection evasion. Such techniques include:

- packing, to generate lots of different hashes for the same code and evade static analysis
- specific command line triggers, to prevent execution in an automated sandboxed environment
- living-off-the-land techniques for downloading updates and maintaining persistence
- creating copies of itself with names that resemble critical system processes
- mimicking various process trees to trick an observer into thinking it is a benign process

Even though AppExe installs through malvertising campaigns, its primary purpose is far from just delivering annoying ads. The capabilities of this malware include:

- backdoor with persistence achieved via scheduled tasks and regular updates saved under various process names
- adding the infected machine to a botnet
- data exfiltration
- remote process execution, mostly cryptocurrency mining and browser information theft

Infection chain



Dropper

The malware arrives on the system via malvertising websites by tricking the user into running an installer bundled with the malicious executable. When launched, the *app.exe* process unpacks its code from its file. The malicious binary file has several variations as it uses a custom packer written in Go. Packing with lots of variations helps Glupteba evade static detection and makes it hard to be signed by scan engines. Our malware zoo currently holds more than 6,500 different Glupteba hashes so far.

Our research identified two code patterns present in 50% of the files analyzed (Appendix 7). These patterns vary slightly (inversed "if" conditions, different mathematical operations with the same results) but they are recognizable nonetheless. The other half of the observed binary files have gone through obfuscation and, subsequently, follow no pattern.

AppExe implements persistence by first copying itself to either \Windows\rss\, \Windows\temp\\ or \AppData\Local\Temp\\ under a name that mimics system processes (csrss.exe, scheduled.exe or the most frequent app.exe, as shown in Appendix 3). Thus, a user might believe the backdoor that runs on the system is benign. Afterwards, the dropper launches schtasks.exe to schedule the executable to run periodically with the highest privileges, along with another scheduled task that downloads the malware again by using certutil.exe. The most common download URLs are listed in Appendix 2.

When the malware runs for the first time, it collects information about the operating system it runs on, hardware configuration and the current user. It also contacts its C&C server to check availability and version. It then creates a registry key in *HKEY_US-ERS\<SID>\Software\Microsoft\TestApp* and store all information there.



| Name | Туре | Data |
|--------------------------|--------------|--|
| ab (Default) | REG_SZ | (value not set) |
| ab) AV | REG_MULTI_SZ | |
| ab CDN | REG_SZ | http://tfortytimes.com |
| Command | REG_QWORD | 0x00000000 (0) |
| a b CPU | REG_SZ | Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8850H CPU @ 2.60GHz |
| ab Defender | REG_SZ | |
| ab Firewall | REG_SZ | |
| RirstInstallDate | REG_QWORD | 0x5dc1214e (1572938062) |
| ab) GPU | REG_SZ | VMware SVGA 3D |
| ab IsAdmin | REG_SZ | 1 |
| ab Name | REG_SZ | WeatheredMorning |
| OSArchitecture | REG_SZ | 64 |
| OSCaption | REG_SZ | Microsoft Windows 10 Education |
| B PatchTime | REG_QWORD | 0x00000000 (0) |
| BB PGDSE | REG_QWORD | 0x00000000 (0) |
| ab) pp | REG_SZ | 0 |
| ₩ SC | REG_QWORD | 0x00000000 (0) |
| Servers | REG_MULTI_SZ | https://venoxcontrol.com https://okonewacon.co |
| ServersVersion | REG_QWORD | 0x00000091 (145) |
| ab ServiceVersion | REG_SZ | |
| ab UUID | REG_SZ | |
| <u>ab</u> ∨C | REG_SZ | 0 |

The process first verifies whether it's running under a regular user or an administrator account. If it is less privileged, it performs a UAC bypass by exploiting the registry checks of an auto-elevated Windows binary, *fodhelper.exe*. Once the malware obtains administrator privileges, it can ensure that its process runs under the SYSTEM user. It steals a winlogon.exe token to run as Trusted Installer [2], which is a process that runs as SYSTEM. After the privileged process starts, the only remaining step is to contact the C&C server and execute the received commands.

Backdoor capabilities and techniques

Like any other backdoor, Glupteba has a command interpreter and can perform various actions upon the C&C server's demand. The main commands are [1]:

- update: download and run the latest version of the malware
- download: download a file to the system
- execute: run a file from on the system
- **notify:** start sending periodic heartbeats to the server
- verify-signature: check the signature of the PE file, to ensure that it is the correct version
- sc: take a screenshot
- upload-file: exfiltrate a file to the server
- update-cdn: update C&C server information

The malware can also steal information from Chrome, Opera and Yandex browsers, including history, cookies and passwords.

Due to the capabilities of the malware, the infected systems get recruited into a botnet. This way, attackers could sell some machines on illicit platforms to perform various tasks. For instance, someone may use a chunk of the botnet to download and execute cryptocurrency miners.


Based on our telemetry, we observed that, in the past few months, Glupteba has been mainly used to execute the browser stealer process, *updateprofile-<random number>.exe*.

The way AppExe runs the payload processes is also deceptive for the user, as the malware changes the payload's parent process to *svchost.exe* instead of itself. This technique is growing in popularity, as shown in Appendix 4.

Techniques Present From MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

| Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Collection | Command and Control | Exfiltration | Impact |
|---------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|--|-----------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|--|-----------------------|
| Command-Line Interface | Registry Run Command-Line Reys / Startup Interface Folder | Access Token Manipulation | Access Token Manipulation | Credentials in Files | Security Soft- Data from ware Discovery Local System | Data from Local System | Commonly Used Port | Data Encrypted | Resource Hijacking |
| Scheduled Task | Scheduled Task | Bypass User Account Control | Bypass User Account Control | | System Information Discovery | Screen Capture | Standard Application Layer Protocol | Exfiltration Over Com- mand and Con- trol Channel | |
| | | Scheduled Task | Deobfuscate/ Decode Files or Information | | System Owner/User Discovery | | | | |
| | | | Disabling Security Tools | | System Time Discovery | | | | |
| | | | File Deletion | | | | | | |
| | | | File and Directory Permissions Modification | | | | | | |
| | | | Software Packing | | | | | | |

Appendix 1 - Monthly detection rate



Appendix 2 - Download URLs since August 2019


| Count | URL |
|-------|--|
| 299 | hxxp://bigtext.club/app/app.exe |
| 283 | hxxp://newscommer.com/app/app.exe |
| 64 | hxxp://tfortytimes.com/app/app.exe |
| 40 | hxxp://gamedemo.xyz/app/app.exe |
| 37 | hxxp://nevernews.club/app/app.exe |
| 29 | hxxp://foxmusic.xyz/app/app.exe |
| 27 | hxxp://skolkovotop.info/app/app.exe |
| 19 | hxxp://beguest.xyz/app/app.exe |
| 10 | hxxp://fstyline.xyz/app/app.exe |
| 6 | hxxp://roundworld.club/app/app.exe |
| 6 | hxxp://andreysharanov.info/app/app.exe |
| 5 | hxxp://headbuild.info/app/app.exe |

| 4 | hxxp://dp.fastandcoolest.com/app/3/app.exe |
|---|--|
| 4 | hxxp://krokas.info/app/app.exe |
| 3 | hxxp://monopeets.com/app/app.exe |
| 3 | hxxp://seamonkey.club/app/app.exe |
| 2 | hxxp://seasondjmusic.com/app/app.exe |
| 2 | hxxp://dp.fastandcoolest.com/app/4/app.exe |
| 2 | hxxp://cfpoweredcdn.com/app/app.exe |
| 2 | hxxp://tfortytimes.com/app/app.exe |
| 2 | hxxp://proactor.xyz/app/app.exe |
| 2 | hxxp://singlemusic.club/app/app.exe |
| 2 | hxxp://jeopath.club/app/app.exe |
| 1 | hxxp://speedandmusic.com/app/app.exe |
| 1 | hxxp://nadequalif.club/app/app.exe |




Appendix 3 - Process name frequency by month

app.exe




csrss.exe




White Paper

B


scheduled.exe



Appendix 4 - Number of detected payloads launched with fake sychost parent



Appendix 5 - Detection distribution by region



| Country | Count |
|---------------------|-------|
| Thailand | 52228 |
| India | 38884 |
| Vietnam | 26596 |
| Algeria | 21365 |
| Malaysia | 18095 |
| Indonesia | 17133 |
| Brazil | 16265 |
| Bangladesh | 12935 |
| Nepal | 12363 |
| Tanzania | 7981 |
| Kenya | 7506 |
| Peru | 6916 |
| Ecuador | 6623 |
| Philippines | 5856 |
| Republic of Moldova | 4998 |
| Mexico | 4550 |
| Chile | 4466 |
| Uganda | 3802 |
| Colombia | 3696 |

| Pakistan | 2398 |
|------------------------------------|------|
| Iran | 2209 |
| Turkey | 1722 |
| Romania | 1643 |
| Sri Lanka | 1332 |
| Brunei | 965 |
| Palestine | 836 |
| Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste | 794 |
| Rwanda | 766 |
| South Africa | 645 |
| Ukraine | 622 |
| Morocco | 585 |
| Cambodia | 543 |
| United Arab Emirates | 531 |
| Sudan | 518 |
| Laos | 421 |
| Russia | 421 |
| Egypt | 312 |
| Georgia | 304 |
| Dominican Republic | 287 |
| Tunisia | 262 |
| Nigeria | 201 |
| | |

| Iraq | 197 |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| Saudi Arabia | 194 |
| Montenegro | 162 |
| Papua New Guinea | 149 |
| Senegal | 129 |
| Argentina | 76 |
| Albania | 70 |
| Zambia | 51 |
| Myanmar | 51 |
| Serbia | 50 |
| Mauritius | 48 |
| United States | 47 |
| Ethiopia | 45 |
| Italy | 43 |
| Bolivia | 40 |
| Germany | 39 |
| Paraguay | 34 |
| Syria | 32 |
| Togo | 28 |
| France | 28 |
| Greece | 26 |
| Hong Kong | 26 |
| Mozambique | 25 |
| Ghana | 24 |
| Panama | 20 |
| Cameroon | 19 |
| Belize | 19 |
| Honduras | 19 |
| Singapore | 18 |
| Hungary | 17 |
| Canada | 16 |
| Kuwait | 14 |
| Malawi | 12 |
| United Kingdom | 12 |
| Mongolia | 9 |
| South Korea | 9 |
| Malta | 8 |
| Guyana | 8 |
| Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan | 8 |
| | |

| Spain | 7 |
|------------------------|---|
| Costa Rica | 6 |
| Croatia | 6 |
| Zimbabwe | 6 |
| Australia | 5 |
| Qatar | 5 |
| New Zealand | 5 |
| Venezuela | 4 |
| Azerbaijan | 4 |
| Oman | 3 |
| Latvia | 3 |
| Taiwan | 3 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 3 |
| Poland | 3 |
| Suriname | 3 |
| Mauritania | 2 |
| Bulgaria | 2 |
| Maldives | 2 |
| Guatemala | 2 |
| Slovenia | 2 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 2 |
| Belarus | 2 |
| El Salvador | 1 |
| Haiti | 1 |
| Portugal | 1 |
| Seychelles | 1 |
| Netherlands | 1 |
| Japan | 1 |

References:

[1] https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/glupteba-campaign-hits-network-routers-and-updates-cc-servers-with-data-from-bitcoin-transactions/

[2] https://github.com/nfedera/run-as-trustedinstaller/blob/master/run-as-trustedinstaller/main.cpp

An extensive list of indicators of compromise is available to Bitdefender Advanced Threat Intelligence users. More information about the program is available at https://www.bitdefender.com/oem/advanced-threat-intelligence.html.

White Paper

B



Bitdefender is a global security technology company that delivers solutions in more than 100 countries through a network of value-added alliances, distributors and reseller partners. Since 2001, Bitdefender has consistently produced award-winning business and consumer security technology, and is a leading security provider in virtualization and cloud technologies. Through R&D, alliances and partnership teams, Bitdefender has elevated the highest standards of security excellence in both its number-one-ranked technology and its strategic alliances with the world's leading virtualization and cloud technology providers.

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